A cross-border deal prices, finances, hedges, pays, and reinvests. Each step has its own currency, and the dollar's lead is not the same size in each.
Share of exports invoiced in U.S. dollars. 6 series: Korea, Brazil, Australia, Japan, United Kingdom, Germany. Latest, 2023: Korea 83.10%; Brazil 95.84%; Australia 89.44%; Japan 50.30%; United Kingdom 39.70%; Germany 16.11%.
The currency a country's exporters write on the invoice, whoever the buyer. Korea, Brazil and Australia price almost everything in dollars, though most of their trade is not with the United States; that is the dollar's pricing role. The dataset is published every few years and ends in 2023; it has no figures for China.
See also: Laurence Wilse-Samson, "Global Finance: A Money View", chapter 22, Commodities and Trade Finance
The currencies Russia's exports are invoiced in. 4 series: U.S. dollar, Euro, Renminbi, Ruble. Latest, 2023: U.S. dollar 22.91%; Euro 8.59%; Renminbi 26.27%; Ruble 38.81%.
After the 2022 sanctions Russia's exporters moved from dollars and euros to renminbi and rubles. The renminbi line starts in 2022, when the dataset first reports it.
See also: Laurence Wilse-Samson, "Global Finance: A Money View", chapter 22, Commodities and Trade Finance
Currency shares of international bonds issued in a foreign currency. 2 series: U.S. dollar, Euro. Latest, 2026 Q2: U.S. dollar 63.02%; Euro 24.38%.
Leaves out bonds sold abroad in the issuer's own currency, such as a German company's euro bond sold in Luxembourg or a U.S. company's dollar bond sold in London. What remains is borrowing in someone else's money, which is where the dollar's lead is starkest. The BIS breaks out only the dollar and the euro (with its legacy currencies before 1999) on this basis.
See also: Laurence Wilse-Samson, "Global Finance: A Money View", chapter 12, International Bond Markets
Currency shares of international debt securities. 5 series: U.S. dollar, Euro, Sterling, Yen, Renminbi. Latest, 2026 Q2: U.S. dollar 46.37%; Euro 39.44%; Sterling 7.46%; Yen 0.92%; Renminbi 0.98%.
Bonds and notes sold outside the issuer's home market, by the currency they are denominated in. The euro line includes its legacy currencies before 1999. The euro's share is swollen by euro-area borrowers selling euro bonds to one another across borders; the companion chart leaves out bonds in the issuer's own currency.
See also: Laurence Wilse-Samson, "Global Finance: A Money View", chapter 12, International Bond Markets
Currency shares of banks' cross-border lending. 4 series: U.S. dollar, Euro, Yen, Sterling. Latest, 2026 Q1: U.S. dollar 45.77%; Euro 32.06%; Yen 4.75%; Sterling 4.47%.
Loans and debt securities that banks hold on borrowers in other countries, by the currency they are denominated in. The euro line includes its legacy currencies before 1999. About a twentieth of claims are not allocated to any currency.
See also: Laurence Wilse-Samson, "Global Finance: A Money View", chapter 7, International Banking
Treasuries and agency bonds the New York Fed holds for foreign central banks. 2 series: Marketable Treasuries in custody, Agency debt and mortgage-backed securities. Latest, 21 Oct 2026: Marketable Treasuries in custody 2572.8; Agency debt and mortgage-backed securities 197.1.
The weekly read on official dollar reserves. It counts only what foreign central banks keep at the New York Fed, not what they hold with private custodians, so it misses part of the picture, but it moves within days when they sell Treasuries to defend a currency. The agency line follows Brad Setser: central banks' holdings of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae bonds here peaked near $900 billion in July 2008, then they fled to Treasuries and never came back. H.4.1 splits custody by type only from July 2007.
See also: Laurence Wilse-Samson, "Global Finance: A Money View", chapter 3, The International Dimension; Brad Setser, "The central bank flight to safety" (CFR, 2008)
China's official reserves and its banks' foreign-currency assets abroad. 3 series: Official foreign currency reserves, Banks' foreign-currency claims abroad, Banks' net foreign-currency claims (claims less liabilities). Latest, 2026 Q2: Official foreign currency reserves 3416.3; Banks' foreign-currency claims abroad —; Banks' net foreign-currency claims (claims less liabilities) —.
Brad Setser's point: China's official reserves have sat just above $3 trillion for a decade, while its state banks have kept adding foreign assets the central bank's books do not show. This chart puts the two side by side. The bank lines cover every bank located in China, in all foreign currencies, as China reports them to the BIS since the end of 2015; Setser counts only the large state commercial banks' dollars, from SAFE, and put their net dollar position above $700 billion at the end of 2025. Neither measure includes the policy banks or the China Investment Corporation.
See also: Laurence Wilse-Samson, "Global Finance: A Money View", chapter 21, Emerging Market Finance; Brad Setser, "China's fake de-dollarization" (CFR, 2026)
The largest foreign holders of U.S. Treasury securities. 5 series: Japan, China (mainland), United Kingdom, Belgium, Cayman Islands. Latest, Aug 2026: Japan 1068.3; China (mainland) 590.7; United Kingdom 1009.5; Belgium 490.5; Cayman Islands 463.0.
Holdings are attributed to the country of the custodian, not the owner, so Belgium (home of Euroclear), the United Kingdom and the Cayman Islands hold much that belongs to others, including, by Brad Setser's reckoning, part of China's reserves. Each June through 2011 the series is re-benchmarked to an annual survey, which makes it jump; June 2010 added about $250 billion to China's holdings. Cayman Islands holdings are shown separately from 2012.
See also: Holdings restated by the issuer's nationality: Global Capital Allocation Project data; Brad Setser, "A Bit More on Chinese, Belgian and Saudi Custodial Holdings" (CFR, 2016); Laurence Wilse-Samson, "Global Finance: A Money View", chapter 3, The International Dimension