Every chart is rebuilt from a public source. A check cites a figure that source published. Unchecked charts are on the site and marked as such.
| Section | Cell | Chart | CSV | Check | Data through | Stale inputs | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| hierarchy | Price | The dollar against a broad basket of trading partners | CSV | Federal Reserve H.10 of 13 Jul 2026, broad index (January 2006 = 100), 8 July 2026, 121.1307 | 16 Oct 2026 | — | |
| hierarchy | Price | Policy rates at the centre and the periphery | CSV | FOMC statement of 16 Sep 2026, target range 3-3/4 to 4 percent; BIS reports the midpoint, 3.875 | Sep 2026 | — | |
| hierarchy | Access | Dollars lent to foreign central banks through Fed swap lines | CSV | Federal Reserve H.4.1 of 15 Oct 2026, table 1, central bank liquidity swaps, Wednesday level 205 million dollars | 21 Oct 2026 | — | Spikes mark moments when the Fed acted as the world's dealer of last resort. |
| hierarchy | Constraint | How many months of imports emerging-market reserves would cover | CSV | World Bank WDI, total reserves in months of imports (FI.RES.TOTL.MO), South Africa 2024, 5.671 (last updated 8 Oct 2026) | 2025 | — | Three months is the conventional floor for adequacy. |
| cycle | Pricing | Share of exports invoiced in U.S. dollars | CSV | Boz et al. (2025), ICPD 2.0 (version of 29 Aug 2025), Japan 2023, exports invoiced in U.S. dollars, 50.3 percent | 2023 | — | The currency a country's exporters write on the invoice, whoever the buyer. Korea, Brazil and Australia price almost everything in dollars, though most of their trade is not with the United States; that is the dollar's pricing role. The dataset is published every few years and ends in 2023; it has no figures for China. |
| cycle | Pricing | The currencies Russia's exports are invoiced in | CSV | Boz et al. (2025), ICPD 2.0 (version of 29 Aug 2025), Russia 2023, exports invoiced in renminbi, 26.27 percent | 2023 | — | After the 2022 sanctions Russia's exporters moved from dollars and euros to renminbi and rubles. The renminbi line starts in 2022, when the dataset first reports it. |
| cycle | Financing | Currency shares of international bonds issued in a foreign currency | CSV | BIS data portal, WS_DEBT_SEC2_PUB, 2026-Q2, U.S. dollar 14,313 of 22,711 billion dollars in foreign-currency issues (63.02 percent), read 24 Oct 2026 | 2026 Q2 | — | Leaves out bonds sold abroad in the issuer's own currency, such as a German company's euro bond sold in Luxembourg or a U.S. company's dollar bond sold in London. What remains is borrowing in someone else's money, which is where the dollar's lead is starkest. The BIS breaks out only the dollar and the euro (with its legacy currencies before 1999) on this basis. |
| cycle | Financing | Currency shares of international debt securities | CSV | BIS data portal, WS_DEBT_SEC2_PUB, 2026-Q2, U.S. dollar 16,274 of 35,096 billion dollars outstanding (46.37 percent), read 24 Oct 2026 | 2026 Q2 | — | Bonds and notes sold outside the issuer's home market, by the currency they are denominated in. The euro line includes its legacy currencies before 1999. The euro's share is swollen by euro-area borrowers selling euro bonds to one another across borders; the companion chart leaves out bonds in the issuer's own currency. |
| cycle | Financing | Currency shares of banks' cross-border lending | CSV | Unchecked | 2026 Q1 | — | Loans and debt securities that banks hold on borrowers in other countries, by the currency they are denominated in. The euro line includes its legacy currencies before 1999. About a twentieth of claims are not allocated to any currency. |
| cycle | Risk transfer | Currency shares of foreign-exchange trading | CSV | BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey 2025, U.S. dollar on one side of 89.2 percent of all tradesBIS Triennial Central Bank Survey 2025, renminbi share of trades, 8.5 percent | 2025 | — | Covers spot trades, forwards, swaps and options. The survey runs every three years, so each point is one April. It starts with the first survey after the euro's launch, because the BIS records the euro as zero before 1999 rather than as its legacy currencies. The dollar's share has barely moved in three decades: it is the vehicle currency, through which most other pairs trade. |
| cycle | Reinvestment | Currency shares of the world's foreign-exchange reserves | CSV | IMF COFER release of 30 Sep 2026, 2026Q2 USD share (SHRO_PT), 56.70 percent | 2026 Q2 | — | Since its December 2025 revision the IMF assigns every reserve to a currency, imputing the part countries do not report (about a tenth of the total), so shares are of all foreign-exchange reserves back to 2000 and run higher than older "allocated" figures. |
| cycle | Reinvestment | Gold's share of the world's official reserves, at market prices | CSV | European Central Bank, The international role of the euro (June 2026), share of gold in total official foreign reserves (foreign exchange and gold) at the end of 2025, 27 percent | 2026 Q2 | — | Gold sits outside the currency shares above: COFER counts only foreign-exchange reserves, so it cannot show central banks moving into an asset no government issues. The rise since 2022 is mostly the gold price: the ECB, whose 27% for the end of 2025 this chart is checked against, puts it down largely to valuation, with gold up about 30% in 2024 and 60% in 2025. Gold now outweighs the euro in official reserves. |
| cycle | Reinvestment | Treasuries and agency bonds the New York Fed holds for foreign central banks | CSV | Federal Reserve H.4.1 of 22 Oct 2026, table 1A, marketable U.S. Treasury securities held in custody for foreign official and international accounts, Wednesday level 2,572,847 million dollarsFederal Reserve H.4.1 of 22 Oct 2026, table 1A, Federal agency debt and mortgage-backed securities held in custody for foreign official and international accounts, Wednesday level 197,148 million dollars | 21 Oct 2026 | — | The weekly read on official dollar reserves. It counts only what foreign central banks keep at the New York Fed, not what they hold with private custodians, so it misses part of the picture, but it moves within days when they sell Treasuries to defend a currency. The agency line follows Brad Setser: central banks' holdings of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae bonds here peaked near $900 billion in July 2008, then they fled to Treasuries and never came back. H.4.1 splits custody by type only from July 2007. |
| cycle | Reinvestment | China's official reserves and its banks' foreign-currency assets abroad | CSV | State Administration of Foreign Exchange, foreign exchange reserves at the end of December 2025, USD 3.3579 trillion (release of 7 January 2026) | 2026 Q2 | — | Brad Setser's point: China's official reserves have sat just above $3 trillion for a decade, while its state banks have kept adding foreign assets the central bank's books do not show. This chart puts the two side by side. The bank lines cover every bank located in China, in all foreign currencies, as China reports them to the BIS since the end of 2015; Setser counts only the large state commercial banks' dollars, from SAFE, and put their net dollar position above $700 billion at the end of 2025. Neither measure includes the policy banks or the China Investment Corporation. |
| cycle | Reinvestment | The largest foreign holders of U.S. Treasury securities | CSV | Treasury TIC table 5, major foreign holders of Treasury securities (October 2026 release), Japan, August 2026, 1,068.3 billion dollarsTreasury TIC historical table of major foreign holders, China (mainland), June 2010, series XI, 1,112.1 billion dollars | Aug 2026 | — | Holdings are attributed to the country of the custodian, not the owner, so Belgium (home of Euroclear), the United Kingdom and the Cayman Islands hold much that belongs to others, including, by Brad Setser's reckoning, part of China's reserves. Each June through 2011 the series is re-benchmarked to an annual survey, which makes it jump; June 2010 added about $250 billion to China's holdings. Cayman Islands holdings are shown separately from 2012. |
| cycle | Reinvestment | Share of foreign-held Treasuries owned by central banks and governments | CSV | Treasury TIC table 5 (October 2026 release), August 2026, foreign official 3,755.6 of 9,331.7 billion dollars (40.25 percent) | Aug 2026 | — | Official holders are foreign central banks, finance ministries and other government institutions; the rest are private investors. Holdings in a private custodian's name can hide official owners, so this is a lower bound on the official share. |
| statecraft | Trade | The U.S. tariff rate actually collected | CSV | BEA NIPA, customs duties 2026 Q2, $306.4bn at a seasonally adjusted annual rate (FRED B235RC1Q027SBEA)BEA NIPA, imports of goods 2026 Q2, $3,727.9bn at a seasonally adjusted annual rate (FRED A255RC1Q027SBEA) | 2026 Q2 | — | Duties actually collected divided by the value of goods imported, both at seasonally adjusted annual rates. It runs below the statutory rate, because importers shift toward lower-tariff goods and sources, and because exemptions and evasion reduce what is collected. |
| statecraft | Trade | U.S. tariffs since 1891, as duties collected on imports | CSV | USITC Table 1 (March 2026), duties collected over total imports 2025, 7.8 percentUSITC Table 1 (March 2026), duties collected over dutiable imports 1932, 59.1 percent | 2025 | — | Fiscal years to 1918, calendar years after; the half-years the table prints for 1918 and 1930 (Smoot-Hawley took effect on 18 June) are summed. The dutiable-imports ratio excludes duty-free goods, and the USITC notes it is overstated before 1993. Both are weak measures of tariff height, because high tariffs choke off the imports they tax. |
| statecraft | Finance | Entries added to the U.S. sanctions list each year | CSV | Unchecked | 2026 | — | Counts people, companies, vessels and aircraft on the current list by the year they were first designated, grouped by sanctions program (an entry can sit in several). Entries since removed are no longer on the list, so earlier years are undercounted. The latest year is year to date. |
| statecraft | Finance | Where the entries added to the U.S. sanctions list are based | CSV | Unchecked | 2026 | — | Counts entries by the countries of their addresses, nationality, citizenship or registration, so an entry tied to two of these countries appears in both lines. This is where the target sits, not which program it falls under: a Hong Kong company supplying Russia's military counts under China and Hong Kong. Only entries still on the list are counted, so earlier years are understated. |
| statecraft | Technology | Commerce rules adding companies to the Entity List | CSV | Unchecked | 2026 | — | Each rule can add one party or hundreds, so this counts how often Commerce acts, not how many parties it lists. The latest year is year to date. |
| notes | — | The New York Fed's estimates of the neutral real interest rate | CSV | New York Fed HLW current estimates of 27 Aug 2026, U.S. r* 2026 Q2 (one-sided), 1.009 percent | 2026 Q2 | — | r*, the real short-term rate expected to prevail when an economy is at full strength and inflation is stable. These are the New York Fed's model estimates, revised with each quarterly release, and carry wide uncertainty; Balance of Power reports them and makes no estimate of its own. |