Treasury's currency report: who meets the criteria
Twice a year the U.S. Treasury tests its 20 largest trading partners against three criteria set under the 2015 Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act. An economy that meets two goes on the monitoring list and stays for at least two reports. This table is Treasury's own assessment, for the four quarters through December 2025; Balance of Power adds nothing to it.
| Economy | Trade surplus with the U.S. ($bn) | Current account (% of GDP) | FX net purchases (% of GDP) | Persistent (8 of 12 months) | Criteria met | Monitoring list |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mexico | 189 meets | -0.5 | 0.0 | No | 1 | No |
| Canada | 19 meets | -0.9 | 0.0 | No | 1 | No |
| China1,2 | 169 meets | 3.8 meets | -0.5 to 1.7 | No | 2 | Yes |
| United Kingdom | -39 | -2.4 | 0.0 | No | 0 | No |
| Germany | 79 meets | 4.5 meets | 0.0 | No | 2 | Yes |
| Japan | 55 meets | 4.8 meets | 0.0 | No | 2 | Yes |
| Ireland | 46 meets | 8.2 meets | 0.0 | No | 2 | Yes |
| Taiwan | 145 meets | 19.5 meets | 0.8 | No | 2 | Yes |
| Switzerland | 2 | 7.0 meets | 0.6 | Yes | 1 | Yes |
| India | 63 meets | -0.4 | -1.1 | No | 1 | No |
| Korea | 45 meets | 6.6 meets | -1.5 | No | 2 | Yes |
| Vietnam3 | 177 meets | 6.7 meets | -0.2 | No | 2 | Yes |
| Netherlands | -81 | 7.8 meets | 0.0 | No | 1 | No |
| France | 21 meets | -0.3 | 0.0 | No | 1 | No |
| Italy | 36 meets | 1.1 | 0.0 | No | 1 | No |
| Singapore | -33 | 16.7 meets | -0.6 | No | 1 | Yes |
| Brazil | -41 | -2.9 | 0.0 | No | 0 | No |
| Thailand3 | 72 meets | 2.8 | 1.8 | Yes | 1 | Yes |
| Australia | -19 | -2.6 | 0.2 | Yes | 0 | No |
| Malaysia3 | 30 meets | 1.6 | 1.3 | Yes | 1 | No |
- Because China does not publish FX intervention, Treasury staff estimates intervention activity from monthly changes in the PBOC’s foreign exchange assets and monthly data on net foreign exchange settlements, adjusted for changes in outstanding forwards. Based on the PBOC's foreign exchange assets data, intervention was not persistent. Based on net foreign exchange settlements data, intervention was persistent.
- Treasury is aware of statistical anomalies that may suggest that China’s current account surplus is higher than what is reported in the official balance of payments data. See “Box 1: Anomalies in China’s Current Account Data” in the June 2024 Report for more details. For consistency with other data in the Report, official balance of payments data are reported here. Using customs data, China’s current account surplus would be 4.4% of GDP.
- Authorities do not publish FX intervention. Authorities have conveyed bilaterally to Treasury the size of net FX purchases during the four quarters ending December 2025.
| Economy | Trade surplus with the U.S. ($bn) | Current account (% of GDP) | FX net purchases (% of GDP) | Persistent (8 of 12 months) | Criteria met | Monitoring list |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Euro area | 93 meets | 1.7 | 0.0 | No | 1 | No |
- Trade surplus with the United States of at least $15 billion.
- Current account surplus of at least 3% of GDP.
- FX net purchases of at least 2% of GDP, persistent in 8 of 12 months.
Of the 20 partners, 14 meet the trade criterion, 10 meet the current-account criterion, and 0 meet the intervention criterion.
Treasury's text counts 15 and 11 economies over the first two thresholds; its Table 1, reproduced here, shows 14 and 10 among the 20 partners.
Source: U.S. Treasury, Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States, July 2026, Table 1.
See also: Laurence Wilse-Samson, "Economic Coercion", chapter 7, Financial Statecraft and Sanctions